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RUNNYMEDE REVISITED
JOHN

S.

GRIMES*

The entourage of President Franklin D. Roosevelt coined the phrase
"New Deal" as though the proposed reshuffling of wealth at the close of
the "Great Depression" was a new development in social progress.
It was, however, merely another step in a movement of periodic realignments of wealth.
Gold, like petroleum, is a fugitive mineral that floats to the top
strata. But when it becomes too highly concentrated at the upper level,
reformation of the social structure becomes inevitable.
To extend the analogy, discontent seethes in every social structure
like lava in the bowels of a volcano until it finds an outlet. If society's
rules permit, this discontent may gradually dissipate without turbulence,
much as the magma placidly flows from rents in the cones of Kilauea or
Mt. Aetna. But if the concentration of lava has crystallized in the throat
of the mountain, internal pressures rise and create the violent explosions
of Krakatoa and Tambora. Similarly, the frozen concentration of wealth
in society's upper strata incites the violent social eruptions of Lenin,
Mao Tse Tung and Castro.
The difference in the intensity of these volcanic phenomena parallels
the dissimilarity in the expression of social discontent in England and
elsewhere. The severity of the strife engendered by social discontent is
to some degree commensurate with the particular society's methods of
periodically realigning its wealth.'
The pattern of continental European society so permitted the
freezing of property concentrations 2 as to bring about the French Revolution, the Peasants' War, the Jacquerie, the Spanish Civil War, the
Mexican tumults of 1850-1870 and 1912-1932, the triumph of
* Professor of Law, Indianapolis Law School, Indiana University.

1. For example, no logical explanation has ever been advanced to enucleate why
the descendants of immigrants from the North German fens evolved legal and governmental concepts that differed materially from those developed in other areas affected
by the Teutonic migrations. Suffice it to say that ancestry was not determinative of the
way a society controls the collection of wealth.
2. See Pock, The Rule Against Perpetuities-A Comparison of Some CommonLaw and Civil Law Jurisdictions, 35 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 62 (1960). By way of contrast,
the Novel of Justinian [A.D. 555] had the effect of prohibiting perpetuities beyond the
fourth generation. Nov. 159. See R. LEE, ELEMENTS OF ROMAN LAW (4th ed. 1956). In
addition, the early Spanish-Mexican grants were originally only life estates which
were gradually extended by successive generations.
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Lenin and the Castro takeover of Cuba. One speaks with awed tones of
Chile becoming the first society to seek Marxism through peaceful
means.2
There never has been a violent social eruption in any country which
has followed the pattern of the English common law. Social restructurizations have been gradual and marked only by minor skirmishes like Wat
Tyler, the Chartist movement, the Whiskey Rebellion and the Eureka
stockade. The Wars of the Roses and the English and American Civil
Wars were dynastic struggles, not social conflicts.
The Anglo-American culture has not found it necessary to resort
to such ultra-legal formulae as the bow string of the Middle East,
the prussic acid of the Borgias or the rack of Pedro the Cruel to redistribute wealth. The doctrines of escheat propter defectum sanguinis
or attainder propter delictum tenetis at least had the cloak of legality.
Instead, the English law as it emerged from the early shadows of the
lex non scripta evinced opposition to concentrations of property holding:
"The law doth abhor a perpetuity." 4 This was cloaked with religious
significance: "For perpetuities do befight against God." 5 Two factors
motivated this opposition to entailments. A perpetual concept of ownership
would have frozen land, and hence power, in private hands and thus
strengthened an oligarchic society at the time a strong central state was
struggling to emerge. In addition, "perpetuities" impeded the development of the mercantile middle class by taking property out of the "stream
of commerce."
English history following the Conquest consists largely of a long
struggle-legal, military and social-among governmental concepts of
totalitarianism centered around the King, a baronial and religious oligarchy and an emerging republican bourgeoisie. The Anglo-American law
of property is deeply stamped with the consequences of this struggle.
Seldom has a legal historian failed to genuflect at the shrine of Magna
Charta, that great charter of our liberties. A cynical eye would reflect
that Runnymede represented a temporary triumph of the conservative
barons, supported by the equally reactionary Dominicans seeking to
3. One may speculate that the destruction of the Minoan culture in about 1500 B.C.
and the decline of the Mayan confederation in the tenth century A.D. might have resulted
from social struggles similar to those named. See 15 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA Maya
Indians at 120 (1963); A. EVANS, THE PALACE OF MINOS (1936) ; J. THOmPSON,
THE RISE AND FALL OF MAYA CIVILIZATION (1956). It has also been speculated that the
Minoan disaster was physical rather than social and resulted from the volcanic eruption
of Thera. See R. HUTCHINSON, PREHISTORIC CRETE 300 (1963).
4. Provost of Beverly's Case, Y.B. Hil. 18 Edw. 3, f. 9 (1366).
5. Chudleigh's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 270 (K.B. 1595).
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establish an oligarchy such as ultimately developed in Germany, over the
early liberals who were headed by the King and backed by the Franciscans
and the Jewish bankers to whom King John had given shelter. After the
crown had ultimately triumphed and had entered into conflict with the
bourgeoisie, Coke and Hampton discovered Magna Charta as a fountain of liberty against the Stuarts, a premise which would have greatly
surprised Stephen Langton.' Paine and Jefferson followed suit when
facing the House of Hanover, and the writings of both exalted Magna
Charta as the foundation of English liberties.
The English solution to the baronial threat was to limit, through
law, concreted wealth. From early times, English jurisprudence placed
restrictions upon perpetual private control of property, which limitations
private power continuously sought to avoid. This confrontation has
gone through three cycles of "entailment" of property to prevent its
dissipation in family ownership. The first involved the "fee tail," which
went through three stages. By the time of Salisbury Oath in 1085,
the sovereign controlled virtually all the land, and hence most of the
wealth, of England.7 William the Conqueror's nielle terre sans seignuer
grants to his tenants in capite, and consequently their subinfeudations,
are propositioned to have been life estates defeasible upon misconduct.'
Upon death of the ancestor, the heir was required to reenter. Such
reentry could only be accomplished by payments of reliefs to the lord.9
This practice was a deterrent to the establishment of a power base in the
family.
But as the royal authority weakened under successive Plantagenets,
feofments et hereditibus suis permitted fees entailed in the family line. 1"
Littleton felt that the development of a warranty represented a successful legal effort to dissolve these "perpetuities;" the result was the fee
simple." Others view the alienable fee simple as a compromise for the
6. Langton was suspended from his archbishopric by the Pope because he would
not enforce the papal censures against the barons after the Magna Charta. See 2 W.
Hoox, LIvEs OF THE ARCHBISHOPS OF CANTERBURY (1884).
7. [T]enet terrain illam de . . . domino Rege. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND,
THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFoRE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 232 (2d reissued

1968). T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE
[hereinafter cited as PLUCKNETr].
8.

J. WILLIAMS,

HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW

PRINCIPLES OF THE LAWS OF REAL PROPERTY

523 (5th ed. 1965)
19 (6th American

ed. 1886).
9.

PLUCKNETTT

524.

10. Id.; P. VINOGRADOFF, THE
(1928); R. GLANviL., DE LEGus ET

COLLECTED PAPERS OF PAUL VINOGRADOFF 57
CONSUETIDINIBUs REGNI ANGLIAE (G. Woodbine

ed. 1932).
11. PLUCKNETT 529; BRACTON's NOTE BOOK 1054 (F. Maitland ed. 1887).
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introduction of primogeniture to fee tails."2 Whatever the cause, the
effect was that the fee simple became alienable and not subject to reversion following termination of the feofee's descending line; thus, it no
longer served to freeze wealth. The fee simple consequently deteriorated
into an estate terminable by the terre-tenant but capable of revesting in
the feoffor. Quia Emptores Terrararum'3 alleviated most of the latter
phase, and the fee simple had ceased to be a perpetuity by the middle of
the thirteenth century.
The restless barons were not content with this collapse of the
entailment and were motivated by the disorders following the death of
Henry II and the nascent power of creditors when John protected the
Jews and the mercantile law recognized De Mercatoribus,4 De
Stapulae," Acton Burnell"8 and the Writ of Elegit. 7 The intrenched
wealth then invoked the second type of fee tail which was created by
limitation to one and the heirs of his body. This limitation, which was
intended to create an estate in the heirs of the descending line, soon went
down before the argument of the "conditional fee." But the Compromise
of the "Lawgiver," Edward I, restored the entailment perpetuity.' 8
Entailment and its offspring primogeniture rocked along without
seriously endangering the body politic for nearly two hundred years.
The frozen wealth situation was eased by the extension of attainder to
fee tails, 9 the fine and common recovery and the helpful influence of the
Black Death and similar mortal ills on escheat.
But in the United States, the English fee tail weakened since it still
protected a class system distasteful to the liberals of the new American
republic. Thomas Jefferson and the first "New Deal" spearheaded the
successful fight in the Virginia House of Burgesses" that led to the
ultimate demise of the fee tail in virtually all American jurisdictions.
While the fee tail was thus struggling with the common law, three
other perpetuities areas were developing. Paralleling and ultimately
succeding the fee tail as the second entailment thrust was the attempt
12. PLUCKN=rT 527-30. Plucknett agrees with Sir Frederick Pollock that by
Bracton's time the words et hereditibus suis no longer gave a feoffment in the family
line. Both further agree that if there was indeed a change in prior law, it was brought
about by the development of primogeniture.

13. 18 Edw. 1. c. 1 (1290).
14. 13 Edw. 1 (1285).

15. 27 Edw. 3. c. 9 (1353).
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

11 Edw. 1 (1283).
13 Edw. 1, c. 18 (1285).
De Donis Conditionalibus, 13 Edw. 1, c. 1 (1285).
26 Hen. 8, c. 13, § 5 (1534) ; 4 & 5 Edw. 6, c. 1 (1551).
Acts of Virginia 7 (1776) (abolished the fee tail estate).
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to encumber the fee simple, by conditions or covenants, with "restraints
on alienation." To combat these restraints, the force of commerce on the
law exacted the five major "perpetuities" rules-mortmain, restraints on
alienation, remoteness of vesting, accumulations and over-long duration
of private trusts-and the five minor rules-death in the lifetime of the
testator, Shelley's Case, Wild's Case, worthier title and earliest possible
vesting.
As commerce developed at the close of the Dark Ages, the state
found it socially desirable to cause wealth to move in the stream of commerce. The common law rose to the issue of the second entailment
scheme with its Rule Against Restraints on Alienation.
Once the fee simple had become capable of alienation, the right
of the holder of the title to transfer it became inseparable from the
fee and attempted permanent limitations thereon became abhorrent to the
law. It is arguable that this Rule Against Restraints on Alienation was
commercial and not political in its motif. It represented the thrust of the
developing mercantile bourgeoisie toward becoming the predominant
factor in osciety at the expense of the feudal aristocracy.
The perpetuities rules of mortmain rose out of the church-state
conflict that paralleled the baron-state struggle. The two entwined when
the Dominicans joined the barons at Runnymede. Indeed, it has been
suggested that the King John-baron controversy was equally a Dominican-Franciscan dispute. Religious institutions in the medieval period
had the authority to acquire and hold land, but possessed only a limited
ability, and even less desire, to alienate it.2
The English crown struck at the potential religious danger to the
state by inventing "mortmain." The English mortmain statutes22 were
intended to save the English body politic from a theocracy. It has been
postulated that the "use" may have been developed as a religious counterthrust to avoid the consequences of mortmain.2" At all events, the use did
permit religious institutions to build up sufficient wealth in England
to furnish some inducement for the Statute of Uses. And, singularly,
the suppression of the monasteries thus placed sufficient wealth in the
21. In other countries, the acquisitive thrust of religious institutions and the
lack of a mortmain concept contributed to a depressed rural economy which was finally
alleviated in Mexico by two long periods of civil war and which still curses much of
Latin America. Events in Mexico following the Juarez constitution of 1852 and the
Madero reforms of 1912 are graphic illustrations of the portent to national security
engendered by legally perpetuated concentrations of wealth in corporate persons.
22. 11 Hen. 3, c. 36 (1225) ; De Viris Religiosis, 7 Edw. 1 (1279) ; 13 Edw. 1, c.
23 (1285) ; 23 Hen. 8, c. 10 (1540) ; Mortmain and Charitable Uses Act of 1888, 51 &
52 Vict, as amended, Act of 1891, 60 & 61 Vict.
23. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 7, at 237-39.
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hands of the King to assure for the crown the support of powerful
forces in England and to insure the success of the English Reformation.
By the latter part of the fifteenth century, after the fee tail had
ceased to be an absolute perpetuity, aristocratic wealth in England,
because of common recovery, fine and attainder, had lost most of the
effectiveness of the shield of the entailment. The landed gentry thus found
themselves without an adequate refuge against insolvency and attainder.
Then the stress of the English Reformation and the growing stimulus
of increased human wants through trade sparked a new type of relief,
the conditional limitation over.24 But the development of the contingent
remainder" proved a lance broken by the doctrine of destructibility.26
The upper class then evoked the protection of the use. As noted, the
use itself may have been born as a scheme to avoid the mortmain statutes;
but its usefulness to the layman became readily apparent. Its development was fostered by the Wars of the Roses. Its usefulness as a cover to
hide wealth,2' as well as a convenient method of transferring property,
made it so popular that by the early part of the fifteenth century virtually
all of the land of England was held to uses.28
The use as a refuge for both the barons and the church thus became
a menace to the power of the state. The royal answer was the Statute
of Uses. 9 However, entrenched wealth had found allies in the developing
legal fraternity. Their ingenuity forged the very Statute of Uses into the
sword and buckler of the springing and shifting use and the executory
devise. Pells v. Brown"° was the new Runnymede. This fostered the
third stage of entailments through the development of the unbreakable
family settlement, thus permitting the future interest to accomplish what
De Donis31 had failed to do.
The indestructible conditional limitation over created a menace that
24. T. LITTLETON, TENURES IN ENGLISH 646 (E. Wambaugh ed. 1903) ; see Colthirst v. Bejushin, 75 Eng. Rep. 33 (K.B. 1550). The increased stress upon the barons
during this period was the result of the creation of new royal courts and the expansion
of the King's prerogatives.
25. Hele v. Hele, 22 Eng. Rep. 831 (Ch. 1680); Chudleigh's Case, 76 Eng. Rep.
270 (K.B. 1595) ; R.

PRESTON, AN ESSAY IN A COURSE OF LECTURES ON ABSTRACTS OF
TITLE 128 (2d ed. 1823).
26. C. FEARNE, CONTINGENT REMAINDERS 286 (7th ed. 1820) ; J. WILLIAMS, THE
SEISIN OF THE FREEHOLD 190, 191 (1878).

27. The preamble to the Statute of Uses, 27 Hen. 8, c. 10 (1536),
of the problems surrounding the use. See also PLUCKNETr 583-86.
28. PLUCKNETT 580-87. See also E. COKE, THE INSTITUTES OF
ENGLAND pt. 1 (1853).
29. 27 Hen. 8, c. 10 (1536).
30. 79 Eng. Rep. 504 (K.B. 1620).
31. Statute of Westminster II, 13 Edw. 1, c. 1 (1285).
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the Rule Against Restraints on Alienation could not confront because the
danger was political rather than commercial, as the uproar over the Duke
of Norfolk and Peter Thellusson indicated. 2 But again the common law
rose to the challenge, first by limiting the effectiveness of the indestructible use by Purefoy v. Rogers,3 and then by developing the Rule Against
Remoteness of Vesting. The Rule Against Restraints on Alienation
operated only upon involuntary freezing of property. The Rule Against
Remoteness of Vesting attacked the efforts of those who deliberately
sought to establish a feudal domain. The Rule clearly surveyed the
political danger arising from invulnerable power structures and placed a
final terminus upon an indestructible concentration of property.
The approbation with which the newly conceived Rule Against
Remoteness of Vesting was received is a phenomenon unique in the
common law. As Gray noted in his comments on the Duke of Norfolk's
Case, 4 the only issue which concerned the courts after this decision
was the gradual judicial determination of the allowable duration of the
postponement of vesting. 5 And though the American judges were often
uncertain about the direction of thrust of the Rule, only one jurisdiction
has ever doubted that it is part of the common law. 6 Even in those
states which date their common law as of Fourth James I," the Rule,
which never was known in 1607, is accepted. And those states which
relate their common law to 1776 accept the Rule as finally formulated by
In re Chardon.38 The final perpetuities attempt of Peter Thellusson"9
was thwarted by the Accumulations Act "' which was much copied in the
United States.
But these major and minor perpetuities rules could not of themselves
suppress the seemingly eternal movement toward concentrations of wealth
that Karl Marx sought to defeat with his "from each according to his
ability, to each according to his need."'" The same human impulses
that sought to avoid taxes and creditors and to build up a power base
32. It was estimated that the accumulations resulting from the consequences of
Peter Thellusson's will would have given the ultimate beneficiary a bequest greater than
the wealth of England. Fortunately, court costs and misadministration finally reduced
the gift to a comparatively paltry sum.
33. 85 Eng. Rep. 1181 (K.B. 1670). The rule in Purefoy v. Rogers was followed

in Aldred v. Sylvester, 184 Ind. 542, 111 N.E. 914 (1916).
34.
36.

22 Eng. Rep. 931 (Ch. 1682).
J. GRAY,THE RULE AGAINST PaRPETUITIES 163 (4th ed. 1942).
Anderson v. Blixt, 72 N.W.2d 799 (N.D. 1955).

37.
38.

Both Illinois and Indiana date their common law as of Fourth James I.
[1928] Ch. 464.

39.
40.
41.

See note 32 supra.
39 & 40 Geo. 3, c. 98 (1800).
See generally K. MARX, CAPITAL (F. Engels ed. 1906).

35.
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through locking up wealth influence persons of the twentieth century
just as they did those of the thirteenth. And the spokesmen of the
modern barons and bishops direct their attack upon the common law
rules which restrain their efforts to exert sempiternal influence upon
wealth. So, new power centers have arisen which require new royal
controls. One of these new baronial groups was the private corporate
sole, which came from the development of the business entity in the
sixteenth century.
It is debatable whether the private, for-profit corporation was an
outgrowth of the religious corporate sole or the borough charter. 2 The
former was subject to control of the sovereign by mortmain. If the latter,
then mortmain was never applicable. It is significant, however, that
most general corporation statutes expressly grant the power to hold
land."3 And, in some states today, certain types of corporations, agricultural corporations, banks or insurance companies, still have a statutory
mortmain.
The first general corporation acts, like most private legislatively
granted charters, imposed limits on corporate durations. Gradually,
these limits were extended until the corporation itself could become a
perpetuity.
Mortmain, however, possibly because the established church had
not been a menace for over two hundred years, was not welded on
American jurisprudence. Mortmain, even if it had been applied by the
courts to the private corporation, affected only real property holdings.
So, without this mortmain control, the industrial revolution evolved
into the corporate society. Corporate mergers and holding companies
raise a threat of monopoly and control as fearsome to the public weal as
was the Earl of Warwick.
But by the twentieth century there came a recognition of this
development of dangers from the corporate trust. So, when the private
corporation, as the offspring of the corporate sole, began to loom large in
the American economy, the king found it necessary to take statutory
action by "trust busting" that almost reached the extent of Valor
Ecceciasticusand the suppression of the monasteries.
Another power center arose out of the wreckage of the guilds. The,
king, for political reasons in the 1930's, fostered this new power center
-the great labor unions-partially to counterbalance the corporate struc42. See, e.g., 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 469-75
(S. Tucker ed. 1803).
43. ILL. ANN. STAT. cl. 32, § 157.5(d) (Smith-Hurd 1966); 23 IND. CODE art. 1,
ch. 2, § 2(b) (4) (1971).
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tures, just as the royal authority had looked to the merchant class for
support against the barons. As the Franciscans and merchants in England
stood beside the King against the Dominicans and the nobility, this
royal sponsorship has enabled the labor organizations to attain wealth
and political power to an extent only recently recognized by the royal
authority as being dangerous to the state."
The royal danger from religious sources which was opposed by
mortmain and the suppression of the monasteries was not dead but
merely sleeping. It has awakened today in the new scheme of the
"charitable foundation." The twinges of conscience that led to gifts to the
established church are recognizable today in the creation of such charitable groups. Avoidance of taxes leads to trusts to provide "fringe
benefits" to employees. In addition, the private trust protects the
spendthrift and avoids succession duties as did the fee tail. Finally, the
age-old objection to debts and taxes has reversed the private perpetuities
structure through the generation skipping trust.
The American early experience with the perpetuities rules was not
mere acceptance, but increased strictness of application. Most of the
major and minor perpetuities rules except mortmain were incorporated
into our jurisprudence in forms even more severe than those of the common law. The early accord on the Rule Against Remoteness and the
Rule Against Absolute Restraints on Alienation was followed by a series
of statutes and even constitutional provisions, begun in Connecticut" and
New York, 6 which, in some instances, shortened the period of the Rule.
None of this legislation at first specifically recognized Remoteness of
Vesting, but instead referred to "perpetuities" or "restraints on alienation." But decisions interpreting these statutes have had divergent opinions
concerning the nature of the evil toward which the statutes were directed.
The early courts, 7 like the earlier lawmakers, approved the philosophy of the Rule Against Remoteness. These judges did not, however,
always carefully analyze its separate place in the perpetuities armory
and confused it with the older Rule Against Absolute Restraints on
Alienation. 8 Some courts later recognized the distinction between the
44. Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq.
(1970).
45. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-95, 96 (1958). See also Abbot, Leases and the
Rule Against Perpetuities,27 YALE L.J. 878 (1918).
46. N.Y. ESTATES, POWERS AND TRUST LAW § 9-1.1 (McKinney 1967).
47. In re Hargreaves, 43 Ch. D. 401 (1890) ; London & Southwestern Ry. Co. v.
Gomm, 20 Ch. D. 562 (1882).
48. Graham v. Whitridge, 99 Md. 248, 57 A. 609 (1904) ; Lovering v. Worthington,
106 Mass. 86 (1870).
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two,49 but the difference was given consideration only from the technical
and not the theoretical viewpoint. The home of the bean and the cod, the
family trust and the "wait and see" seems to have been one of the first
states to recognize the Rule Against Remoteness in its classic form,
0 and distinguishing
anticipating even Cadell v. Palmer,"
between restraints on alienation and remoteness of vesting. "
The unique, unquestioned acceptance of the Rule Against Remoteness
of Vesting by the American courts points to the recognition of the major
public policy against crystallization of private wealth and power. No
court has ever had the temerity to question the wisdom of the Rule. And
until the last decade, virtually the only legislative interference was to
follow New York's example and fortify the Rule's defenses or to shorten
the time involved.
This acceptance of the Rule in the early stages of American law
parallels the legislative destruction of the last vestiges of the other entailment, the fee tail, and the early dislike of the spendthrift trust. All
reflect the Jeffersonian-Jacksonian democratic philosophy. The quondam
concept that anything approaching a perpetuity was somehow sacrilegious
has never been recognized in America; however, the courts have not
clearly recognized the political significance of the common law abhorrence
of perpetuities. The English courts in the slow evolution of the Remoteness Rule did not give clear indication of its basic purpose. Their opinions
apparently were not explicit enough to enable the "colonials" to understand
the Rule's fundamental target-accumulations of wealth and power.
Two conflicting concepts have struggled for mastery in the progress
of the Rule: 1) the commercial need for freedom of alienation and 2) the
state obsession against accumulation of wealth and its consequent power.
Both are reflected in the Duke of Norfolk's Case. fee v. Audley,5 ' with
its rigid applications, would indicate a development of public policy. 8
But in the case of the will of the Swiss Jeweler,5 4 when all England was
aroused by the possibilities of accumulations, it remained for Parliament
to face the political danger by creating a new perpetuities rule, the prohibition of improper accumulation." American jurisdictions have done
E.g., Matter of Wilcox, 194 N.Y. 288, 87 N.E. 497 (1909). See also J. GRAY,
1-4 (4th ed. 1942).
50. 6 Eng. Rep. 956 (H.L. 1833).
51. Hawley v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 8 Mass. 3 (1811).
52. 29 Eng. Rep. 1186 (CIL 1787).
53. The court in lee v. Atudley considered only the remote contingencies that
might have occurred following the death of the testator and ignored the actual events
which transpired prior to trial of the case.
54. Thellusson v. Woodford, 31 Eng. Rep. 117 (Ch. 1799).
55. Thellusson Act, 39 & 40 Geo. 3, c. 98 (1800).
49.

THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES §§
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likewise." The American courts and legislatures have shown a similar
lethargy in failing to distinguish between the Rule Against Restraints on
Alienation, which is primarily a rule affecting commercial interests,5"
and the Rule Against Remoteness of Vesting, which is based upon
political concepts. Too often the courts and the statutes have fallen into
the trap of upholding a limitation that was too remote in fact merely
because all affected parties could terminate it by joining in an alienation.5"
Despite these miscomprehensions, the Rule Against Remoteness remained a viable weapon against accumulations of wealth and power that
might menace the royal authority.5"
After the middle of the nineteenth century, and as a part of the
industrial development that required adequate financial backing, a dislike
of perpetuities rules developed in this country. Earlier cases indicated
an inclination on the part of the courts to extend the scope of the Rule
Against Remoteness beyond mere property concepts. But with the
change in social philosophy which followed the Civil War, there commenced a traceable change in attitude toward perpetuities. Wealth became
an ideal, not a menace. Horatio Alger's heroes were not directed toward
public service but instead became examples of material prosperity.
As a result of this shift in attitude, the benign smile the law had
previously cast upon the Rule Against Remoteness came into eclipse
during the twentieth century. There is even an inclination to ascribe the
Rules Against Perpetuities to an outmoded feudal basis. But no court
has yet had the temerity to repudiate the remoteness concept, and modern
law has developed new institutions which largely avoid the Rule's impact.
This dislike derives from the same forces that caused the development
of the Rules in the first instance, concentrations of wealth and power and
the removal of property from the stream of commerce.
Much of the judicial obfuscation was caused by the lack of historical
explanation of the Rule. Certainly John Chipman Gray's story of the
Rule's growth"° did not fully illustrate the causes, economic or political.
Its role as a social factor in guarding against private concentrations of
wealth and power has been largely overlooked.
56. ALA. CODE tit. 47, §§ 16-18 (1958) ; MONT. REv. CODES ANN. §§ 67-406 to -407,
-413 (1958).
57. Eaton v. Miller, 250 A.2d 220 (Me. 1969) ; Standard Knitting Mills, Inc. v. Allen, 221 Tenn. 90, 424 S.W.2d 796 (1967) ; Kettler v Atkinson, 38 S.W.2d 557 (Tex.

1964).
58. Dozier v. Troy Drive-In-Theatres, Inc., 265 Ala. 93, 89 So. 2d 537 (1956);
Duff-Norton Co. v. Hall, 268 N.C. 275, 150 S.E.2d 425 (1966).
59. In re Campbell's Estate, 28 Cal. App. 2d 102, 82 P.2d 22 (1938) ; First Camden
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Collins, 114 N.J. 59, 168 A. 225 (1933).
60. J. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PmPETurrEs 126 et seq. (4th ed. 1942).
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Repeatedly, the dynastic basis of the Rule has been confused with
the commercial concept of the Rule Against Restraints on Alienation.
And there has even been an inclination to treat the Rules as an atavism
relating back to the feudal concept. The Rule Against Remoteness, however, is rooted in the same public policy that fought against entailment;
it is intended to defeat the oligarchic threat that Pells v. Brown engendered.
One phase of this formal movement against the Rule has been to
limit its application to property interests only. 6' The cases which have
dealt with the application of the Rule to facts not involving contingent
future interests give pleasure to the legal scholars, but to few others.
So, while options which may be exercised beyond the period of the Rule
have been criticized by the courts, the more modern tendency has been
to support them upon various grounds. 2 The point is made that an
option creates no property rights but is contractual only. 3 Hence, the
continuance of an option for a time not tied to the Rule or extending
beyond the Rule is not, it is said, affected by the Rule. 4 And the rule
of "reasonableness" has been applied to defend options indefinite in
duration6 5 as well as other indefinite time situations.6" The argument
that the Rule is applicable to the option itself and not the property which
is its subject has also been made; the result is to treat the interest as
vested in the optionee.6 7
In addition, there is strong aversion expressed to applying the Rule
to other interests in property. 8 Thus, certain mineral 9 and timber"
61. Warner-Lambert Pharmaceutical Co. v. John J. Reynolds, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 655
(S.D.N.Y. 1959).
62. Rountree v. Richardson, 268 Ala. 448, 108 So. 2d 152 (1959).
63. First Natl Bank & Trust v. Purcell, 244 S.W.2d 458 (Ky. App. 1951).
64. Kingston v. Home Life Ins. Co., 11 Del. Ch. 258, 101 A. 898 (1917), affd, 11
Del. Ch. 428, 104 A. 25 (1918).
65. E.g., Morning Star Mining Co. v. Bennett, 164 Ark. 244, 261 S.W. 639 (1924);
Childs v. Sherman, 351 Mass. 450, 221 N.E.2d 748 (1966) ; Isen v. Giant Food, Inc., 295
F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
The "wait and see" doctrine was indirectly applied when an agreement to lease a
building when erected was upheld. The court justified such result on the ground that the
parties ratified the lease agreement when the lessor was permitted to assume possession.
Cruz v. McGregor, 178 Cal. App. 2d 45, 2 Cal. Rptr. 727 (1960).
66. Gould v. Rite-Way Oil and Inv. Co., 143 Colo. 65, 351 P.2d 849 (1960) ; Childs
v. Sherman, 351 Mass. 450, 221 N.E.2d 748 (1966) ; Mattern v. Herzog, 367 S.W.2d 312
(Tex. 1963). There is a presumption in New York that where vesting is contingent upon
probate of a will, appointment of a fiduciary or distribution of an estate, such will occur
within the time permitted by the Rule. N.Y. ESTATES, POWERS AND TRUST LAW § 9-1.3(d)
(McKinney 1967).
67. Mattern v. Herzog, 367 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1963).
68. Priddel v. Shanlde, 69 Cal. App. 2d 319, 159 P.2d 430 (1945).
69. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Peterson, 218 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1954).
70. Carthnon v. Strams-Culber Lumber Co., 60 Fla. 313, 53 So. 738 (1910).
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interests have been held to be outside the Rule; restrictive covenants"' and
equitable servitudes"' have been excluded and the cy pres doctrine has
been invoked to save an otherwise void private gift."
The trend since the latter part of the nineteenth century has been
toward a legal philosophy which declared that property rules, their purposes somewhat obscured by time, were objectionable merely because
they were old. Hence, Shelley's Case, Wild's Case and the Doctrine of
Worthier Title have largely passed from the American scene. Even the
concepts of "death in the lifetime of the testator" and "earliest possible
vesting" have often been treated with contempt. A majority of jurisdictions no longer fears a spendthrift trust. This distaste for things grounded
in the past too often forgets that such rules may have had their origin in
principles of public policy which have not entirely vanished. This
attitude touched Remoteness of Vesting even before the advent of the
generation skipping drive.
The Rule has also been successfully avoided by attacks based on the
issue of contingency. Thus, "earliest possible vesting" operates to save
interests otherwise void if contingent."4 And the separation of conditions
precedent from conditions subsequent preserves interests which can be
treated as vested subject to divesting instead of contingent."5
The earlier cases would indicate that the Rule could not enter into the
question of construction of an instrument.' Now there is authority that
if an instrument is capable of two constructions, one of which would
violate the Rule and the other not, the Rule may be disregarded so as to
affirm and preserve the construction in favor of validity.
There is
also a strong present tendency to avoid infectious disability and to separate
valid from invalid limitations."
England reacted more slowly than
71.

Strong v. Shatto, 45 Cal. App. 29, 187 P. 159 (1919) ; Pierce v. St. Louis Trust

Co., 311 Mo. 262, 278 S.W. 398 (1925).
72. Council v. Sanderlin, 183 N.C. 253, 111 S.E. 265 (1922).
73. Moore v. Livingston, 265 N.E.2d 251 (Ind. App. 1970). See also IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 55-111 (1947) ; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.98.030 (1967) ; R. LYNN, THE
MODERN RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES

34-35 (1966); Quarles, The Cy Pres Doctrine:

Its Application to Cases Involving the Rule Against Perpetuitiesand Trusts for Accumulation, 21 N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. 384 (1946) ; Browder, Construction, Reformation, and the
Rule Against Perpetuities,62 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1963).
74. An extreme example is U.S. iv. 1.5,883.55 Acres of Land, 54 F. Supp. 849 (W.D.
S.C. 1944).
75. Hunt v. Carroll, 157 S.W2d 429 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
76. In re Helme's Estate, 95 N.J. Eq. 197, 123 A. 43 (1923) ; Cattlin v. Brown, 68
Eng. Rep. 1319 (1853) ; Leake v. Robinson, 35 Eng. Rep. 979 (1817).
77. Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank & Trust v. Llewellyn, 67 Ill. App. 2d 171, 214
N.E.2d 471 (1966); Merchant's Nat'l Bank v. Curtis, 98 N.H. 225, 97 A.2d 207 (1953);
In re Morrison's Will, 25 N.Y.S.2d 408 (1941).

78.

Richards v. Stone, 283 Mich. 485, 278 N.W. 657 (1938).
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America to the antiquated fee tail and Lloyd George found it necessary
to adopt "death duties" to break up the holdings of the great English
families.
The "succession tax," another device to restrain the passage of
wealth from one generation to another, was welcomed by the thirsty
American government, particularly because of the financial strains of the
Depression and World War II. But the impact of succession and income
taxes is received with no better grace by the modern economic nobility
than the royal prerogatives were by the feudal nobles. And to the rescue
have come the paladins, the estate planners, inspired by their ladies fair,
the corporate trustees. The modern entailment springs, strangely, from
two of the evolvements of the Statute of Uses, the trust and the future
interest. Thus, there arise the foundation and the generation skipping
trust. But in the path of their development loom the perpetuities rules as
developed in the United States. Particularly obstructive is the Rule
Against Remoteness of Vesting with the time limitation it imposes upon
the generation skip. So, it is not surprising that the Rule itself is now
under attack.
The present major opposition to the perpetuities rules results from
the post World War II impact of income and succession taxes. Cynically,
the popularity of the private foundation stems as much from its tax
shelter aspects as from its eleemosynary aspects. And the "fringe
benefits" of labor union contracts have decided tax benefits also.
The generation skipping aspects of the family trust have been of
major consequence in easing the pain of estate taxes as well as in providing the salutary effects of the eighteenth century family settlement.
Most of the statutes that provided for a period of time shorter than the
rule of In re Chardon have been changed to the common law period.
In the heyday of the Rule before the baronial forces launched their
present attack, the period must have been definitely tied to lives in being,
years in gross and gestations. Any other period of measurement, however short in probability, made the limitation over void. Late cases
indicate a retreat from this fiat and the substitution of reasonableness
of the uncertain period."9
These chinks in the Rule's armor have been further exploited in a
number of fashions: statutory extension of the time permitted under the
Rule, the "wait and see" doctrine, statutory exemption of certain legal
situations from operation of the Rule, elimination of the effect of Jee v.
79. Compare Trautz v. Letup, 329 Mo. 580, 46 S.W.2d 135 (1932) with Belfield v.
Booth, 63 Conn. 299, 27 A. 585 (1893).
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Audley and opposition to extending the area of the Rule.
The "wait and see" doctrine, which is followed in a limited body
of judicial and statutory authority, removes the eo instanti feature of
invalidity and permits the issue to remain uncertain for the period of the
Rule in hope that vesting will occur during the interim. Other statutes
have exempted pension trusts, profit sharing income plans and retirement
income programs from the Rule. Statutory amendments stretch the
previously limited periods to the limit of the common law rule and even
beyond.81
In some areas where there has not been "perpetuities" control of
wealth, a noticeable movement toward dissolution of such concentrations
is underway. In Mexico, of course, nationalization of foreign investments has been completed and the ejido system has to a considerable
extent supplanted the latafundia created by the plantation and church
owned land that had been created by an absence of perpetuities and
mortmain control. Chile, with its asentamiento and its new Marxist
movement, is endeavoring to follow the same course. Venezuela, with
its actio, finds it is promoting minifundia by delivering titles to the resettled peasants. Bolivia and Peru are making motions toward following
the same course. Brazil has feebly made similar gestures.
The direction of this movement is opposite from the trend in the
United States. Here, the fact that mortmain has not been accepted as
common law has opened a channel for the concentration of baronial
wealth that is having definite social consequences. The similarity of
investment programs of the great foundations and trusts is having a
direct effect upon the securities market and hence upon the economy.
The latest triumph of the baronial champions came in Wisconsin.
Continuing to ignore the different public policies behind the Rule Against
Restraints on Alienation and the Rule Against Remoteness of Vesting,
that state's legislature has apparently permitted a private trust to continue in perpetuity.82 Wisconsin has thus returned in equity to the concept of entailment and now stands at A.D. 1290 and De Donis. It remains to be seen whether this generation skipping avoidance of income
and estate taxes will find favor in other jurisdictions.
The royal wrath is not likely to be withheld from those infringements upon the sovereign's prerogatives epitomized by the Wisconsin
statute. Mr. Justice Brandeis trumpeted that mere bigness is itself a
80. ILL. ANN.
§§ 11-102 (1957).
81.

M.

82.

WIS.

STAT.

ch. 48, §§ 39t-u (Smith-Hurd 1966);

§ 101 (1964).
§§ 230.15, .16 (1971).

REV. STAT. ANN. fit. 33,
STAT. ANN.
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danger; and the king is arming. The Federal Trade Commission and the
Internal Revenue Service both act as a substitute for De Viris Religiosis8s
and the Thellusson Act. The 1969 Congress took steps to provide a
substitute for the Thellusson Act as applicable to foundations and similar
trusts. While the attempt of the king to terminate the estate tax advantage
of generation skipping by the family trust was not completed in 1969,
the limited response of the sovereign in the Congress will undoubtedly be accelerated. It is predicted that these baronial attempts to
avoid the Rule Against Remoteness and create new entailments will have
consequences ruinous to the efforts of the estate planners as well as to
the foundation proponents. This time, no crossing of the Wash nor bowl
of cherries will thwart the king's triumph.
The much vilified King John, whatever may have been his actual
motivation, was supporting the public policy against crystallization of
wealth that has been the pole star of the English common law and which
conceived the Rule Against Remoteness of Vesting. The modern "estate
planners" champion the reactionary forces whose success in other nations
ultimately led to the tragedies of the Iron Curtain, Cuba, China and presently, on the west coast of South America.
Thus, the Internal Revenue Service, though its motif may be like
that of the Plantagenets, the raising of royal revenues, is nevertheless, by
regulating trust accumulations, assisting in the preservation of the social
structure long found desirable in Anglo-American society.
The present situation resembles that of the early nineteenth century.
The English courts in the Thellusson case did not comprehend a public
danger in accumulations sufficient to induce them to develop a new perpetuities rule against accumulations. But the King and Parliament,
realizing the peril, responded with the Thellusson Act.
Today, the force of the estate planners and the power of private and
public trusts and foundations have blunted the judicial thrust against
perpetuities. The concept of "too long duration of trust," public or private,
has not received wide acceptance. It remains, therefore, for the king,
along with his faithful champion the Internal Revenue Service, to join
with the Congress and, by administrative and legislative action, to
create further checks upon the amassing of wealth both in public and
private hands.
The legal historian will recognize that it is fallacious to treat the
Rule Against Remoteness of Vesting or indeed any of the "perpetuities"
rules as legal atavisms spawned by a feudal age. All represent the re83. 7 Edw. 1 (1279).
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sistance of any organized society to the attempts of pressure groups at
creating a Polish Oligarchical state.
The medieval combine of private interests, the barons, corporate
groups and the religious institutions, today blossom into the estate
planners and the "non-profit" trusts. Perpetuities are as essential to the
latter as they were to the former. Likewise, the dangers to the sovereign
are as real as they were in 1213. The perpetuities rules, therefore, are
still a vital part of social controls. As has repeatedly happened, the
perpetuity controls already developed may not be sufficient to counter
the ingenuity of the baronial lawyers and, as before, new legislative
controls are indicated.
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